Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots / by Gernot Sieg. - (Working Paper Series / Economics Department ; No. 04)

Sieg, Gernot

Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports refer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing rule is a use-it-or-lose-it rule.

Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports refer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport profits increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The profit-maximizing rule is a use-it-or-lose-it rule.

Vorschau

Zitieren

Zitierform:

Sieg, Gernot: Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots / by Gernot Sieg. - (Working Paper Series / Economics Department ; No. 04).

Zugriffsstatistik

Gesamt:
Volltextzugriffe:
Metadatenansicht:
12 Monate:
Volltextzugriffe:
Metadatenansicht:

Details anzeigen

Rechte

Nutzung und Vervielfältigung:
Alle Rechte vorbehalten

Export